With their growing popularity and widespread applications, face recognition systems are attracting more attention from attackers. Thus, face presentation attack detection has emerged as an important research topic in recent years. Existing methods for face presentation attack detection are affected by different cameras and display devices, and their performance is degraded in cross-database testing. In this paper, we propose a face presentation attack detection scheme that fuses multi-perspective dynamic features. One feature is the globally extracted temporal motion pattern of a face in a video. This involves mapping the local and global motion information of the face in the video into a single image. The motion patterns of genuine and fake faces are different, and these patterns are independent of cameras and display devices. Another feature is the visual rhythm of noise patterns, which differs significantly between single and secondary imaging. The proposed scheme fuses these two features at the decision level. Cross-database tests were conducted among the CASIA-FASD, MSU-MFSD and Replay-Attack databases. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the development of deep learning technology has significantly improved the accuracy of face recognition and facilitated widespread applications of face recognition systems. Face recognition is widely used in access control [1] and identity verification in electronic businesses, banks, among others. Therefore, human faces are increasingly associated with privacy and personal property. Given this association, face-based identity verification systems have attracted the attention of attackers, who attempt to invade systems with presentation attacks (spoofing attacks in early studies). Consequently, face presentation attack detection (or anti-spoofing) has emerged as an important research topic.
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There are several types of face presentation attacks, as shown in Figure 1 . In a photo attack, a clearly printed photo is presented to the system [2] , as shown in Figure 1(a) . In a video attack, a high-resolution video is played using electronic equipment, as shown in Figure 1(b) . Other methods are more sophisticated, such as those involving warped and cut photos, as shown in Figures 1(c) and (d) . In addition, a 3D model attack tricks a system using a 3D model, as shown in Figure 1 (e). Figure 1 (f) shows a silicone mask, with which criminals can camouflage themselves [3] - [5] . In New York City, an African American man wore a silicone mask to disguise himself as a white police officer in order to rob a check-cashing store.
In this paper, we focus on photo and video attacks. Several face presentation attack detection methods have been developed to counter photo and video attacks. They can VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ be categorized as methods based on static features and those based on dynamic features. Methods based on static features, such as color texture [6] and local shade [7] , consider the features in a single frame. Methods based on dynamic information exploit unconscious facial motions, such as blinking [8] and micro-expressions [9] . Further, optical flow [10] , which is extracted from two adjacent frames, is typically used as a dynamic feature for presentation attack detection. Existing methods extract dynamic features from a single frame or two adjacent frames. However, it is obvious that these features present the local rather than global motion patterns of a video. Moreover, these algorithms are mainly tested on a single database, in which the facial images, both real and fake, are generally captured using the same device. In practice, it is impossible to capture face images using only a single type of camera; instead, cross-device scenarios are pertinent to adequate attack detection. However, the performance of existing methods for such applications is unsatisfactory. For example, Yang proposed a face presentation attack detection algorithm based on a convolutional neural network (CNN) and obtained a half total error rate (HTER) of 2.93% for the test set from the database that was also used as the training database; however, the HTER increased to 39.49% [11] in the cross-database test. This is because the final imaging results of genuine and fake faces are influenced by the cameras, display devices, and imaging environments. In the cross-database test, some of these factors may differ from those in the case of the training set. Thus, the trained models have poor generalization ability. For instance, in a high-resolution photo attack, the final fake face images are similar to the genuine face images. Therefore, extracting essential differences between genuine and fake faces for cross-database presentation attack detection is necessary. This means that the differences must be independent of cameras, display devices, and imaging environments.
As is well known, humans perform many unconscious facial motions, such as blinking and micro-expressions, and these movements can be extracted regardless of the type of camera or imaging environment. Facial motions are controlled by muscles around the eyes, mouth, among others [12] , [13] . Although facial contours vary among individuals, the muscular distributions are similar. Therefore, the deformations of facial surfaces are also similar [14] , [15] . Such motion always exists and is unrelated to equipment. Moreover, such motion patterns do not exist in photo attacks. In video attacks, secondary imaging degrades the facial motion patterns, which differ significantly from those of a genuine face. Therefore, motion patterns can be used as a feature for face presentation attack detection [16] , [17] .
In addition, compared with genuine access, photo and video attacks involve secondary imaging. The imaging process is performed by a camera that has an imaging sensor with numerous photosensitive transducers that convert light energy into electrical charges. In [18] , Lukas et al. defined the noise patterns resulting from the photo-responsiveness of non-uniform light-sensitive cells (PRNU) and used them to identify the specific camera. Furthermore, secondary imaging involves more noise because of the additional generation and viewing process of the display device [19] . On the basis of these observations, Pinto proposed a noise signature to distinguish real from fake biometric data and achieved good performance [19] .
Motivated by these factors, we propose multi-perspective dynamic features for face presentation attack detection. The proposed scheme, the framework for which is shown in Figure 2 , involves two types of dynamic features. The first type comprises motion patterns that globally map temporal motions into a single image. The method for extracting the motion patterns was inspired by the imaging process of motion-blurred images, and treats each pixel in every frame as a time-varying signal, and then computes the integration on the duration of the video. We thus obtain a motion pattern map as a single image. The small natural motions of genuine faces are absent in fake ones; hence, motion patterns can be used to detect liveness. The second type of feature is the visual rhythm of noise patterns produced during imaging. This is used to determine whether the video involves secondary imaging. The two types of features in our scheme are device-independent. Our experimental results indicate that the proposed method outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms in terms of cross-database performance.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) We propose a novel scheme to extract the facial motion patterns in a video by analyzing the pixel value changes throughout the video. The scheme globally maps the temporal motion information into a single image by integrating each pixel in the time domain. The experimental results verified the effectiveness of this feature.
2) Considering the complementarity between the motion pattern and the noise pattern, we further combine the motion pattern with the noise pattern, thereby further improving the performance of cross-database face representation attack detection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related studies. Section 3 describes the proposed algorithm in detail, including facial motion mapping, noise patterns, and classification based on multi-perspective features. Section 4 discusses the experimental procedure and analyzes the experimental results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, face presentation attack detection methods have become increasingly important. Accordingly, researchers have introduced additional information to improve the performance of these methods. Thus, face presentation attack detection methods can be generally categorized into those with additional information and those without additional information. The former methods employ not only videos and images captured using cameras but also data obtained from other sensors or through user interactions. The latter methods use only videos and images captured by cameras and, as such, are inexpensive, user-friendly, and convenient.
Xie used a light field camera [20] for face presentation attack detection and achieved remarkable accuracy. Ning employed structural information in 3D space by using a binocular camera to detect face liveness [21] . These schemes offer good performance. However, they require additional devices, which make them expensive and prevent their widespread application. Algorithms based on user interaction require the subjects to perform some assigned actions [22] or read random numbers [23] . Moreover, they require additional time and do not provide a user-friendly experience for authentication.
Face presentation attack detection algorithms without additional information can be further categorized into those based on static features and those based on dynamic features.
Methods based on static features exploit color, texture, or other information by searching for evidence or artifacts useful for detecting liveness. However, such methods can only consider the features in a single frame. To address this problem, Pinto analyzed the visual rhythm of noise patterns resulting from the PRNU of light-sensitive cells [19] . If the video involves secondary imaging, the noise patterns will differ from those in the case of single imaging. Accordingly, the residual noise videos and Fourier spectrum videos were calculated. Finally, the visual rhythm of the noise video was used for liveness detection. Experimental results showed that this approach provides effective presentation attack detection for 2D face recognition systems. However, this method is considerably influenced by the display device; hence, it cannot tackle new attacks effectively owing to the ever-growing market of acquisition and display devices.
Methods based on dynamic features focus on facial motion to detect liveness. In 2007, Pan et al. investigated the action of blinking to detect attacks performed with photographs [24] and reported a false-alarm rate of less than 1%. However, blink detection alone cannot be used to tackle video attacks. In [25] , Yin et al. detected photo and video attacks based on the optical flow field. They calculated the displacement of the optical flow between two successive frames and obtained a displacement sum of a certain number of frames, which differs between real access and presentation attacks. However, this algorithm was tested exclusively on a single database, and its cross-database performance is unknown. In [16] , Li et al. analyzed the effect on motion blur information caused by screen smearing in replay attack, and it is effective in detecting replay attack. The slight downside is that the motion of the face itself is not being exploited.
Further, in 2017, Lakshminarayana et al. considered breathing as a major factor in liveness detection because it causes facial blood flow, leading to slight changes in the color of facial images [26] . By contrast, the changes in photo and video attacks are insignificant. Accordingly, the authors used energy mapping to capture such changes for liveness detection. However, in practice, the slight changes in skin color are difficult to extract as they are influenced by noise and illumination. Moreover, this approach does not work for facial images in which the subject has applied make-up.
In general, existing methods based on dynamic information consider a specific action or the difference between two adjacent frames rather than the globally extracted temporal motion pattern in the entire video. Table 1 gives the comparison of existing face presentation attack detection methods and their limitations.
With the application of deep learning in computer vision, some researchers apply it to face presentation attack detection and achieve better results, such as deep local binary patterns [27] , partial convolutional neural network [28] , hybrid convolutional neural network [29] .
To improve the cross-database performance of face presentation attack detection, several methods that combine static and dynamic features have been proposed in the literature. In 2016, Patel et al. proposed a method that can learn deep texture features from both aligned facial images and whole frames to achieve better generalization performance, and they combined this approach with blink detection for crossdatabase face presentation attack detection [8] . They used the Unconstrained Smartphone Spoof Attack Database [31] (USSA) as the training set for learning and the Replay-Attack [32] and CASIA-FASD [33] for testing. Wu et al. employed the consistency motion information of different databases, such as blinking, mouth movements, and facial expressions, and developed cross-database voting for transfer between databases [10] . As a result, the cross-database HTER (training on CASIA-FASD, testing on Replay-Attack database) was reduced significantly. In 2017, for crossdatabase face presentation attack detection, Boulkenafet et al. extracted speeded-up robust features from different color spaces of face images, and applied Fisher vector encoding to describe the facial appearance (SURF&FVE). This method achieved good performance in the cross-database evaluation [34] .
In this paper, to improve the cross-database performance of face presentation attack detection, we propose a novel method for extracting temporal-global facial motion patterns. This approach was inspired by the imaging process of motion-blurred images, assisted by noise patterns. Our results show that multi-perspective dynamic features achieve better cross-database performance compared to state-of-theart algorithms.
III. METHODOLOGY
The proposed scheme involves four steps: video preprocessing, facial motion pattern extraction, noise pattern extraction, and classification. The framework for the scheme is shown in Figure 2 .
A. VIDEO PREPROCESSING
To avoid being affected by background, we first perform suitable video cropping. For a video, we determine the face location in the first frame by face detection. Then, all the frames of the video are cropped according to the face location in the first frame. In general, the subject's unconscious movement is under control; thus, first-frame face detection is feasible. After preprocessing, video of the face and some background are captured, as shown in Fig 2(a) .
B. FACIAL MOTION PATTERN EXTRACTION
Inspired by motion-blurred images, we propose the concept of facial motion mapping, which globally summarizes the temporal motion pattern of a face in a video.
1) IMAGING PROCESS FOR A MOTION-BLURRED IMAGE
A motion-blurred image is the result of relative motion between the camera and the subject being photographed during the exposure time. The advantage of a motionblurred image is that it contains extra motion information. Figure 3 shows examples of motion-blurred images. Figures 3(a) and (b) are of the same scene, but we can see that Fig. 3(a) is captured by a fast forward-moving (or backwardmoving) camera. In the case of Fig. 3(b) , by contrast, the camera is moving horizontally. From this figure, we can see that different relative motion patterns lead to motion-blurred images with different texture information. Moreover, in the case of the running boy shown in Figure 3 (c), his arms are moving faster than his body. In summary, motion-blurred images contain abundant motion information.
To use this motion information, we need to understand the imaging process of a motion-blurred image mathematically. Suppose that there is relative motion between the scene F and the camera. The motion distances in the x-and y-directions are x 0 (t) and y 0 (t), respectively. The total exposure at point (x, y) is obtained by integrating the instantaneous exposure over the exposure time T [35] :
where (x, y) is the required value of point (x, y) in the blurred image, and F(x, y) is the scene captured. We provide an example to explain the generation of a motion-blurred image in the physical world. Suppose that the facial expression transforms from serious to smiling during the exposure time. In this case, the region around the corners of the mouth will move a certain distance. We map this displacement on the x-and y-axes as x 0 (t) and y 0 (t), respectively. Hence, the imaging result of point (x, y) is the integration of the points that pass through it.
2) MOTION-BLURRED IMAGE OF THE VIDEO
In contrast to the process described above, we want to represent the motion-blurred image of a video instead of the real physical scene. To do so, we treat the video as a moving subject and the video duration as the exposure time.
We can represent the motion-blurred image in the video as follows:
Figure 4(a) shows an example of a motion-blurred image in a video. Nevertheless, we focus on motion information in this paper, and the motion-blurred image obtained from Eq. (2) is easily affected by brightness. Hence, we remove the average before integration. Moreover, to avoid the offset between positive and negative values, we integrate the squares of the values. The final formula is as follows:
where avg [V (.)] denotes the average of V (.), and (p, q) denotes the value of point (p, q) in the motion-blurred image after removing the average. When the signal is sampled at the frame rate, the motionblurred image can be expressed as where V p,q (k) is the value of point (p, q) in the k-th frame and l is the frame number. Finally, we derive the facial motion mapping of the video. Figure 4(b) shows an example of a motion-blurred image in a video with the average removed, highlighting the motion information compared to Figure 4 (a).
3) CALCULATE THE MOTION-BLURRED IMAGE OF THE VIDEO
The detailed steps for calculating the motion-blurred image of the video are as follows: 1) We treat each pixel in the video as a time series signal that is sampled at the frame rate. Among the three channels (R, G, B), we choose the G channel in subsequent steps because the green component infiltrates human skin better than the red and blue components [36] .
2) A low-pass filter is used to eliminate noise. The cutoff frequency is set to 2.25 Hz, which is nearly equal to the maximum heart rate.
3) We then remove the average of the signal and integrate it using Eq. (4).
We further analyze two typical videos, as shown in Figure 5 . The video in the first row (shown in Figure 5(a) ) shows a fixed-photo attack, where there is neither global motion nor local motion. The video in the bottom row (shown in Figure 5 (e)) shows a genuine face, and the requestor moves to the left in the video. The changes in the nose tip location in the two videos are compared. The video of the fixed-photo attack is nearly static (as shown in Figure 5(b) ), such that the signal is extremely flat. After removing the average, the amplitude is close to 0 (as shown in Figure 5 (c)), so the integration of this location is low. By contrast, in the video of a genuine face, the signal fluctuates considerably (as shown in Figure 5 (f)). As a result, its integration value is high.
4) ANALYSIS OF MOTION PATTERN IN THE VIDEO
In this section, we discuss the differences between genuine and fake faces. A genuine requestor exhibits unintentional waggle, called global motion, along with some local motion, such as blinking, mouth movements, and facial expressions. Moreover, the face and background move independently. A photo attack involves only global motion. A video attack involves both global and local motion, but if we move the display device, the face and background move simultaneously.
These characteristics can be reflected in the map in different forms. Figure 6 shows the facial motion patterns under different conditions. Images in each row represent the motion maps of clips in the same video. The video types in each row comprise a genuine face, fixed-photo attack, attack with large movement, hand-held photo attack, and fixed-video attack. We can see that the motion patterns of a genuine face include global and local motion (cheeks and the upper eyelid). For the fixed-photo attack, the motion mapping is extremely flat, and there is almost no motion. In the third row, the face moves quickly in the video, and local motion is drastically disrupted by global motion, which is unfavorable for classification. In practice, this problem can be solved by adjusting the threshold, as genuine requestors will cooperate with video capture in general. In the fourth row, motion mapping of a hand-held photo attack mainly includes global motion, with the exception of local motion. Finally, the motion pattern from a fixed-video attack is very similar to that of a genuine face (when we ignore the degradation caused by secondary imaging). To address this issue, we introduce another feature, namely noise patterns. 
C. NOISE PATTERN EXTRACTION
Luka et al. [18] defined the spatial noise pattern in an image caused by the PRNU of light-sensitive cells. The noise pattern is time-invariant and independent of the video content. Luka et al. [18] considered the reference pattern noise as a spread-spectrum watermark of the camera and explored it in an effort to identify specific cameras. Malicious attacks involve additional imaging and display on the screens; thus, an attack video will contain different or additional noise compared to a genuine face video. Thus, the noise distance between single imaging and secondary imaging is greater than that between different cameras in single imaging. On the basis of this concept, Pinto et al. [19] used the visual rhythm of noise patterns for face liveness detection.
The detailed steps for extracting noise patterns are as follows:
First, we extract the noise in the video. Suppose that v is an input video. The residual noise video v NR can be computed as follows [19] :
where v gray is the gray-scaled video, and v Filtered is the filtered video generated from v gray . Second, a 2D discrete Fourier transform is applied to each frame of the residual noise video v NR , as formalized in Eq. (6) . Then, the Fourier spectrum FS(u, w) can be obtained. In Eq. Next, the visual rhythm is employed to summarize the Fourier spectrum. In 1999, Chung proposed the concept of visual rhythm, which involves selecting a particular strip in each frame to form a 2D image [37] . Visual rhythm has since been adopted in action recognition [38] and text caption location [39] in videos. Here, the selection of the strip is vital. Usually, the central horizontal or vertical strip is chosen. Figure 7 (a) shows the generation of visual rhythm, where the red box represents the selected strip, the solid line represents the vertical strip, and the dotted line represents the horizontal strip. When the horizontal strip is selected, it should be transposed before forming the visual rhythm. Figure 7(b) shows the visual rhythm of photo attack(upper) and genuine face(lower). We can see that the visual rhythm of photo attack and genuine face are obviously different with each other.
D. CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we use the two above-mentioned types of features for classification. At present, the most effective method for classifying images is the CNN. However, after spatialtemporal mapping, the samples are insufficient for training the CNN. Considering that the difference between two classes in terms of multi-perspective features mainly includes texture information, we extract the gray-level co-occurrence matrix (GLCM) of two features for classification. The concept of the GLCM was proposed by Haralick in 1973; it was used to analyze texture information in an image through the spatial correlation characteristics of the gray levels [40] . The extracted facial motion mapping or visual rhythm of the noise patterns can be represented as a gray-level image. We extract the GLCM features of these images and convert them into a 1D vector. The classification is conducted using a support vector machine (SVM) [41] .
Fusing the multi-perspective dynamic features is crucial, insofar as doing so influences the final performance. In this study, we evaluated three types of fusion strategies: feature fusion, score fusion, and decision fusion. In feature fusion, we concatenate the two GLCM vectors of the multiperspective features into a long vector and input the connected vectors into the SVM classifier. In score fusion, we derive the scores of two GLCM features using the SVM classifier and fuse the two normalized scores to obtain the final decision results. In decision fusion, we give priority to facial energy mapping with the assistance of noise patterns. In particular, from different clips in a video, several facial motion maps can be derived, and, accordingly, the same number of classification results will be derived. If the voting result has high confidence, it will be the final output; otherwise, the decision result of the noise pattern is used. The process is expressed as follows:
where D is the final decision result, P positive is the proportion of true votes in facial motion map voting, and D noise pattern is the decision result of the noise pattern feature. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS A. DATABASES
In our experiments, three public databases were used: the Replay-Attack database [32] , CASIA-FASD [33] , and MSU-MFSD [42] .
Released publicly in 2012, the Replay-Attack database for face presentation attacks contains 1300 videos of real accesses, photo attack attempts, and video attack attempts for 50 clients under different lighting conditions. These videos were divided into four subsets: a training set (60 real accesses and 300 attacks), a development set (60 real accesses and 300 attacks), a test set (80 real accesses and 300 attacks), and an enrollment set (100 real accesses for studying the baseline performance of face recognition systems). To perform the attacks, high-resolution photos and videos from each client were fixed or hand-held in front of a camera.
In the same year, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Automation released another face presentation attack detection database (CASIA-FASD) that focuses on the variation in the collected data. The database consists of 50 clients with varying imaging quality. Three types of attacks are included, namely a warped photo attack, cut photo attack, and video attack. There are 12 videos of each subject (3 genuine and 9 fake), and the final database contains 600 videos. Examples of presentation attack images from these three databases are shown in Fig. 8 . We can see that CASIA-FASD has more types of attacks, resolutions, and scales compared to the Replay-Attack database. The three databases were created using different acquisition and display devices under different environments. Hence, cross-database testing is challenging.
Most face presentation attack detection cross-database studies performed training on CASIA-FASD and testing on the Replay-Attack database, because the attacks in CASIA-FASD are more diverse. For comparison with these studies, we performed the same experiments. In addition, to validate the generalization of proposed method, we also provide cross-database results from training on the MSU-MFSD database and testing on the Replay-Attack database.
B. SETTINGS
In this section, we discuss the detailed settings of our experiments.
The results of the facial motion mapping calculations are related to the duration of the videos. It is essential to capture constant-duration clips. Video clips that are too short cannot provide sufficient motion information. The lengths of the videos in CASIA-FASD are not the same, and the shortest length is 4 s. Taking this into consideration, we captured the 4-s clips with a 1-s interval in longer videos. As the duration time of videos in the Replay-Attack database is 10 s or 15 s, we could respectively derive either 6 or 11 facial motion mappings from each video.
To extract the noise pattern, referring to [19] , we used a Gaussian filter with µ = 0, σ = 2, and a size of 7×7 to filter the original video. The noise residual video is the subtraction of the low-filtered video from the original video. We then calculated the Fourier spectrum of each frames in the noise residual video. To summarize the Fourier spectrum, we selected a vertical strip of Fourier spectrum frames with a width of 30 pixels to form the visual rhythm.
To make the fusion effect more convincing, the Fig. 9 shows the results of the ablation study on decision fusion which is clarified in Eq. (7) . In Fig. 9 , the plane coordinates are L threshold and H threshold respectively, which are two important thresholds and actually reflect the weights of the two features in the fusion. If H threshold = 1, and L threshold = 0, then the final result is the ones based on noise pattern. If H threshold = L threshold , the final result is based on motion pattern completely. The vertical coordinate is the corresponding HTER result when trained on CASIA-FASD, and tested on the Replay-Attack database. When H threshold = 0.8 and L threshold = 0.2, the HTER achieved the lowest value, which is 19.75%. These two optimal thresholds will also serve as the basis for comparing the results later in this paper.
C. COMPARISON OF SINGLE FEATURE AND MULTI-PERSPECTIVE FEATURES
The experimental results were evaluated in terms of the Half Total Error Rate (HTER), which is the mean of the false rejection rate (FRR) and the false acceptance rate (FAR), which is robust to unbalanced samples. In our experiment, we focused on the cross-database performance (between CASIA-FASD and Replay-Attack database). The cross-database HTER based on a single feature and multi-perspective features is listed in Table 2 .
For training on CASIA-FASD and testing on the Replay-Attack database, the HTER performance is 32.80% when using the motion pattern exclusively, and 34.13% when using the noise pattern exclusively. As we derived correspondingly either 6 or 11 facial motion mappings from each video in the Replay-Attack database, we used the voting strategy to improve the HTER performance, decreasing it to 28.12%. Because we did not cut the video into clips while extracting noise patterns, we could extract only a single noise pattern from the video. As a result, there was no voting result from the noise pattern.
As described above, to fuse the multi-perspective features, we used three fusion strategies: feature fusion, score fusion, and decision fusion. We can see from Table 2 that decision fusion is the best strategy, and the HTER with decision fusion is 19.75%. The FRR and FAR are 16.25% and 23.25%, respectively.
For training on the Replay Attack database and testing on the CASIA database, the accuracy is much lower (shown in Table 2 ). The HTER with decision fusion is 30.55%. This is because the data and the attacks in testing set (CASIA) are more varied and complicated in the training set (Replay Attack). Table 3 compares the face presentation attack detection results of the proposed method with those of state-of-theart algorithms. From Table 3 , we can see that the proposed VOLUME 8, 2020 method outperforms the other methods considerably. The image-distortion analysis (IDA)-based method achieved a leap-type performance (HTER, 3.50%) in 2016, although this was partly dependent on vast training data [31] , [42] . In this work, the USSA database was used as the training set, consisting of 8K training samples. In [31] , the relationship between the amount of training data and the performance was analyzed, and they found that the HTER was 20.90% when using 1K samples for training.
D. COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART ALGORITHMS
In addition, we conduct the intra-test experiments with the Replay Attack and CASIA databases, as shown in Table 4 . Our proposed method extracts the motion pattern and the noise pattern, and these features are independent of the capture equipment. As a result, the proposed method is not an advantage on intra-test experiments.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we analyzed the accuracy of every type of video (see Table 5 ). There are three columns of data based on different information in Table 5 : the motion pattern, noise pattern, and their fusion. Each column has seven values: HTER, FRR, FAR, and FAR for fixed attacks, FAR for hand-held attacks, FAR for video attacks, and FAR for photo attacks. From Table 5 , we can see that, for genuine access (blue cells), the motion pattern is more effective, which means that motion patterns of genuine access are closer, and with smaller intra-class distance. Nevertheless, for attacks (purple cells), the motion pattern is observed to be inferior to the noise pattern. Due to the diversity of attacks such as photo, video, printed, replay, fixed and hand-held attacks, the motion patterns of attacks have relatively larger intra-class distance compared to genuine access. On the contrary, the noise pattern is more effective on replay attacks for the noise like moireaģ | pattern and distortion is more serious when capturing the replay screen; hence, these two features are complementary. As such, it is feasible to ameliorate the results with the addition of noise patterns. Indeed, doing so reduces the FAR value significantly. For certain specific types of attacks (the four lower lines), we can see that by assisting the motion pattern with the noise pattern, the FAR improves. Detection of hand-held attacks using the motion pattern (yellow cells) shows the worst performance, as the display device is controlled by moving the hands and the unconscious movement of the hands is similar to those of the face. Between video and photo attacks, the noise pattern is more effective with video attacks (red cells), indicating that noise patterns are more discriminative when displaying the video on electronic screens rather than that in the case of paper photos.
Based on these analysis, motion patterns are more effective for genuine access, whereas noise patterns are more suitable for detecting fake access. The final HTER (gray cell in Table 5 ) is 19.75%, which is 8.37% lower than that based on the motion pattern and 14.38% lower than that based on the noise pattern exclusively.
In addition, we analyzed the misclassified videos in the Replay-Attack database for each type of attack (see Table 6 ). From Table 6 , we can see that the proposed method filters out most of the video and fixed-photo attacks, and that a handheld photo is more deceptive to the proposed method.
To validate the generalization of the proposed method, we tested the inter-database performance between the Replay-Attack and MSU-MFSD databases. The methods for comparison included the LBP method proposed in [47] , the DoG-LBP method proposed in [33] , and the IDA method proposed in [42] . Wen et al. conducted cross-database experiments based on these methods. For comparison, we used the same evaluation index as [42] , viz., TPR@ FAR-a comparison of the true positive rate (TPR) when the FAR is fixed. We used MSU-MFSD for training and the Replay-Attack database for testing, and divided the attacks into two types: replay attacks and printed attacks. The compared results are shown in Table 7 . From Table 7 , we can see that the proposed scheme is better than LBP and DoG-LBP. Its performance is worse than that of IDA, which included a total of four features-specular refection, blurriness, chromatic moment and color diversity-and needed to extract these four static features in every frame.
V. CONCLUSION
For cross-database applications of face presentation attack detection, we proposed a novel method based on multiperspective dynamic features. One of the features is the facial motion pattern, which maps the overall motion information in a video into a single image. The other feature is the noise pattern, which is obtained in the imaging process and is related to whether the video involves secondary imaging. These multi-perspective dynamic features are inherent and independent of the camera, display device, and detection environment. Therefore, the proposed method achieves good cross-database performance. The experimental results (using CASIA-FASD as the training set and the Replay-Attack database as the test set) showed that the proposed method outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms. The results also showed that the proposed method is not very effective against hand-held photo attacks. In future research, we will introduce additional information, such as blink information, to resolve this problem. YAOWEN XU received the bachelor's degree in electronic engineering from the Beijing University of Technology, Beijing, China, in 2016, where he is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree in information and communication engineering. His main research interest is face presentation attack detection.
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